COMMENTS
THE CONSTITUTION OFFERS No PROTECTION WITHOUT
RECOURSE TO A REMEDY: WHY CONSTITUTIONAL ERRORS IN
A POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDING SHOULD BE COGNIZABLE
IN A PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS

Mira Baylsor
I. INTRODUCTION

Our legal system is replete with normative maxims but rarely absolute principles. Take for example Chief Justice Marshall's famous
declaration in Marbury v. Madison: "The government of the United
States has been emphatically termed a government of laws, and not of
men. It will certainly cease to deserve this high appellation, if the
laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right."' This
renowned phrase is seemingly an absolute principal, yet in practice, it
is at best a normative maxim. Under prevailing law, state prisoners
ensconced in their state habeas proceedings are held in exactly this
position. They have vested rights protected by the Federal Constitution, which could be violated, and yet they seem to have no remedy
available if and when such violations occur. The writ of habeas corpus is the only logical (and available) avenue to address these violations even if its use may be contrary to the prevailing legal perspective
on the Great Writ.2
Is a writ of habeas corpus the vehicle to challenge constitutional
errors in a postconviction proceeding? This question is largely unan-
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swered, ignored by the Supreme Court and largely considered a dead
issue due to a twenty-five-year-old federal circuit split between a heavily favored majority opinion 3 held by five circuits and a minority opinion announced by the First Circuit.4 An initial answer to this question

would be no. The passage of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) effectively limited the scope of habeas
corpus. This development, combined with the agreement of the majority of the circuits on this issue, strongly suggests that the prevailing
attitude is no.
With Pennsylvania v. Finley, the Supreme Court sent a message that
certain constitutional rights (such as the Sixth Amendment right to
counsel) are not automatically extended to prisoners in postconviction proceedings.6 The Court extended this ruling in its hotly con7 stating "the
tested 54 decision of Murray v. Giarratano,
rule of Pennsylvania v. Finley should apply no differently in capital cases than in
noncapital cases., 8 With this decision, our question becomes more
complex. Now it is unclear not just whether a writ of habeas can be
used to challenge constitutional violations occurring during a postconviction proceeding, but also whether prisoners have constitutional
protections in these proceedings at all. As a practical matter, if a
prisoner's due process rights were violated in a state habeas proceeding, what recourse would he have?
For prisoners facing capital punishment, it is not fundamentally
fair for their remaining avenue to a new trial to be just as constitutionally protected as a civil suit for defamation. Yet, this would seem
to be the case. Can the minimal protection of due process really be
all the protection offered by the Federal Constitution to capital prisoners? The answer to this question lies within the Supreme Court's
3

SeeWilliams v. Missouri, 640 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 990 (1981); see
also Kirby v. Dutton, 794 F.2d 245 (6th Cir. 1986); Vail v. Procunier, 747 F.2d 277 (5th
Cir. 1984); Dankert v.Wharton, 733 F.2d 1537 (1lth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1020
(1984); Lumbert v. Finley, 735 F.2d 239 (7th Cir. 1984); Mitchell v. Wyrick, 727 F.2d 773
(8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 823 (1984); Gibson v. Jackson, 578 F.2d 1045 (5th
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1119 (1979); Rheuark v. Shaw, 547 F.2d 1257 (5th Cir.
1977); Quails v. Shaw, 535 F.2d 318 (5th Cir. 1976).
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Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1984) (holding habeas corpus is the proper

vehicle for an equal protection challenge to a state postconviction review process).
5

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214 (1996) [hereinafter AEDPA] (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).

6

481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987) ("States have no obligation to provide this avenue of [postconviction] relief, and when they do, the fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process
Clause does not require that the State supply a lawyer as well." (citation omitted)).

7
8

492 U.S. 1 (1989).
Id. at 10.
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decisions in the past ten years and also within the postconviction statutes created and passed by states, the statutes' subsequent legislative
history, and the historical purpose and basis of the great writ of habeas corpus.
This topic is difficult to explore because there is no instant case to
examine, no particularly egregious example of the constitutional violations envisioned and the consequent barring of avenues for redress.
But if some constitutional rights must exist in the postconviction setting, they must be cognizable in habeas jurisprudence because it is
the only vehicle available to protect prisoners (especially those facing
the death penalty) from constitutionally defective state postconviction proceedings.
This Comment is not an attempt to argue that a constitutional error in a postconviction proceeding should invalidate the underlying
conviction. 9 While some might balk at the question of what, if any,
additional constitutional protections the states or the Constitution
should afford capital defendants, everyone in the United States is afforded due process and equal protection under the Constitution, regardless of one's crime.'0 Those who are sentenced to death, the
most heinous punishment meted out in our system of justice, should
be granted opportunities to address allegedly unconstitutional state
procedures barring them from pursuing exoneration or commuted
life sentences.
Prisoners are entitled to constitutional rights throughout their
criminal proceedings, at pre-trial, trial, and post-trial." Remedies for
the violation of a prisoner's constitutional rights while in custody
form the core function of the Great Writ. Without the use of the writ
of habeas corpus, these constitutional violations are unreachable, irremediable; the prisoners are stuck, silenced. As Justice Holmes said,

9

10

11

The conviction should be invalidated only in those situations in which the constitutional
error in the postconviction proceeding blocked a relevant claim resulting from the underlying criminal procedure. If, for example, the judge's bias in the state postconviction
proceeding estopped a prisoner from bringing a claim under Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S.
79 (1986), then the remedy would be the reversal of the underlying conviction. See the
hypotheticals discussed infta notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
For example, the extension of the Eighth Amendment's protection should "not end once
a defendant has been validly convicted and sentenced." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390,
432 (1993) (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
SeeWolffv. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 555-56 (1974) ("[A] prisoner is not wholly stripped
of constitutional protections when he is imprisoned for crime. There is no iron curtain
drawn between the Constitution and the prisons of this country.... Prisoners may also
claim the protections of the Due Process Clause. They may not be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law.").
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"what we have to deal with [on habeas review] is not the petitioners'
innocence or guilt but solely the question whether their constitutional rights have been preserved."'
Constitutional errors in postconviction proceedings should therefore be cognizable as the basis
for a writ of habeas corpus.
Part II of this Comment will briefly summarize the history of habeas in America and its use by state prisoners in federal courts (a
more modern application of the writ than originally envisioned).
Part III will examine the twenty-five-year-old circuit split, dissecting
the legal basis for both the majority and the minority opinions. Part
IV will scrutinize the state statutes directing collateral review, arguing
that these statutes, in many cases, are criminal in nature and therefore constitutionally defective because of the limited protections that
they grant petitioners. Part V will explicate the legal basis for recognizing and providing avenues of relief using the writ of habeas corpus
for constitutional violations that occur in state collateral review. Finally, Part VI will propose possible solutions to rectify these unconstitutional deprivations of due process as well as address residual issues
of comity and finality of criminal sentences.
II. THE HISTORICAL EXPANSION OF THE GREAT WRIT
The Writ of Habeas Corpus has an illustrious history. Known as
"the most celebrated writ in English law," 3 it is mentioned explicitly
in the United States Constitution: "The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when
in Cases of Rebel14
lion or Invasion the public Safetymay require it.'
The traditional purpose of habeas corpus is "an attack by a person
in custody upon the legality of that custody, and.., the traditional
function of the writ is to secure release from illegal custody." 15 The
constitutional provision's language is a bit odd. It does not grant the
privilege of the writ or define its scope-this is left to the statutory6
devices of Congress. Instead, it merely prohibits its suspension.1
12
13

14

15
16

Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88 (1923).
*129. Federal habeas corpus is the focus of this
Comment, and it is therefore concerned only with the writ of habeas corpus, known more
formally as habeas corpus ad subjiciendum. For more information on the different and
varied uses of the many types of writs of habeas corpus in England, see WILLIAM F. DUKER,
A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF HABEAS CoRPus (1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 484 (1973).
Erwin Chemerinsky, Thinking About Habeas Corpus, 37 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 748, 752
(1987).
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Originally, the purpose of the prohibition in the Constitution was to
protect federal prisoners from a tyrannical centralized power, authorizing the states to grant the writ.1 7 The scope of the writ was conditioned upon statutory authorization, and so the Judiciary Act of 1789
granted authority to federal courts to grant the writ for federal prisoners. 18 But it was not until after the Civil War when Congress explicitly granted federal courts the ability to issue writs of habeas corpus
for state prisoners.' 9
Concerned by what they saw as the Southern states' resistance to
the implementation of the Reconstruction Act (specifically, the act's
abolishment of slavery), Congress enacted the Acts of February 5,
1867,20 granting jurisdiction to federal courts to grant writs of habeas
corpus for state prisoners. The purpose of this grant of jurisdiction
was to protect former slaves from unconstitutional confinement;21 yet
until 1915, these uses of the writ were largely unrecognizable to modern eyes. In Frank v. Mangum, 9 the Court spoke of the writ in the
broad terms envisioned in the Acts of 1867, explaining its availability
whenever a state's judicial system "deprive [s] any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law., 23 This recognition of
the scope of the writ was groundbreaking, but it was not until the incorporation doctrine and the application of the Bill of Rights to the
States that the writ of habeas corpus was actually used to vindicate the
constitutional rights of state prisoners.
Beginning in the late 1930s, the Supreme Court identified sections of the Bill of Rights which applied to the states. By the end of
the 1960s, most of the amendments in the Bill of Rights dealing with
criminal procedure were applied to both the states and the federal

17

DUKER, supra note 13, 126-56.

18

See FREEDMAN, supra note 2, at 10-46 (concluding that federal courts were always author-

19

ized to grant habeas corpus to state prisoners, regardless of the Supreme Court's decision
in Ex parleDorr,44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845)).
Id.

20

Acts of February 5, 1867, chs. 27-28, 14 Stat. 385 (codified as 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2255

21

(2000)).
The second Act provided "[tihat the several courts of the United
States ...within their respective jurisdictions, in addition to the authority already conferred by law, shall have power to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the [C]onstitution, or of any
treaty or law of the United States." Id.
Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 753.

22

237 U.S. 309 (1915) (requiring only a notice and a hearing before a court of competent
jurisdiction for criminal state proceedings to meet the requirements of due process).

23

Id. at 311.

24

See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326-27 (1937) (explaining the premise behind the
incorporation doctrine).
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government.2 5 The decisions of the Warren Court were largely re26
sponsible for the resulting widening of the scope of habeas corpus.
Definitive identification of the cause of this enlargement is difficult to
ascertain, but the effect of the civil rights movement combined with
the clear and convincing evidence of the discriminatory, unconstitutional actions of many Southern state courts towards African Americans indicates that, as after the Civil War, the Supreme Court
used
27
habeas corpus "as a vehicle to uphold and advance civil rights.

The Warren Court enlarged the category of claims cognizable under habeas as violations of the Bill of Rights applied to the states. 28
Seemingly, the Court espoused Justice Holmes's view of when use of
the writ was appropriate: "We are not speaking of mere disorder, or
mere irregularities in procedure, but of a case where the processes of
justice are actually subverted. 2 9 This attitude towards the writ was
short-lived, reined in by both Congress and future Courts. °
In subsequent years, under both the Burger and Rehnquist
Courts, the attitude towards habeas corpus was markedly different."
Political conservatives had long alleged that the actual use of the writ
"permitted guilty defendants to secure their release from prison, ' ,3 2
not to assert and protect constitutional rights. The Burger Court,
and even more so, the Rehnquist Court, were concerned with other
effects of the enlarged scope of the writ of habeas. Issues of finality of
convictions, comity between state and federal courts,3 and the costs
of litigating habeas corpus were paramount for these courts. 4 These
25

See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (requiring states to grant the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel to criminal defendants); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961)

27

(commanding the states to grant the Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure to its citizens).
See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (requiring states to give warnings of the
right against self-incrimination to possible defendants).
CHEMERINSKY, supranote 2, at 847.

28

1 RANDY HERTZ &JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

29

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 411 (1963) (quoting Frank v. Magnum, 237 U.S. 309, 347
(1915) (Holmes,J., dissenting)).

30

HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28, § 2.4.

31

See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 761 (identifying the distinctions between the Warren
and Burger Courts' jurisprudence regarding habeas corpus).

32

Id.

26

§ 2.4.

33

For an exhaustive examination of the issues of comity, see J. Skelly Wright & Abraham D.
Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpusfor State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility,
75 YALE L.J. 895 (1966).

34

See Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 309-10 (1989) (issuing a determinative rubric for dealing with retroactive decisions of the Supreme Court in light of the expensive costs of liti-

gating habeas corpus claims).
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judicial concerns were echoed by the federal legislature which significantly narrowed the scope of habeas corpus and limited the cognizability of certain claims with the passage in 1996 of AEDPA.
The habeas corpus landscape changed after the passage of
AEDPA. The Act imposed a statute of limitations of one year on habeas petitions, 36 generally prohibited successive habeas petitions, and
narrowed the scope of the review,37 changing the standard under
which the federal district courts were to review the state decisions
(previously it was de novo) to one of extreme deference.38 While the
ramifications of these changes are still not fully known, the passage
was clearly "a dramatic restriction on the scope of the writ of habeas
corpus.3 9 AEDPA narrowed the jurisdictional scope of habeas, but it
was largely quiet (with a few exceptions) on the question of the subject matter scope of the writ itself.
AEDPA codified much of the current Court's jurisprudence on
habeas corpus. In one of the few exceptions to its focus on jurisdiction, AEDPA statutorily prohibited a specific type of claim as the basis
for a habeas petition. Section 2254(i) specifically denies the cognizability of a Sixth Amendment claim based on ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel in the collateral postconviction proceedings. °
Directly echoing the Supreme Court's holding in Murray v. Giarratano,1 which extended the Court's holding in Pennsylvania v. Finley0

to capital as well as non-capital cases, AEDPA effectively closed off
this potential subject matter. In contrast, the statute was silent as to
the cognizability of other constitutional violations in postconviction
proceedings.
The statute does provide a catchall exception which could apply to
constitutional errors in postconviction proceedings. Section 2254
35
36
37
38

AEDPA (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28 U.S.C. § 2244 (2000). However, there are certain provisions that provide for a statute
of limitations of only 180 days if the state can "opt-in." See id. §§ 2261-2263.
Id. § 2254.
Id. § 2254(d). The new standard required the denial of a habeas petition unless the state
court adjudication of the underlying claim "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Law, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States." Id. § 2254(d)(1). However, if the petitioner
had not been able to raise the claim in state court for a number of different reasons, then
review reverted to de novo.

39

CHEMERINSKY, supranote 2, at 849.

40
41

28 U.S.C. § 2254(i).
492 U.S. 1, 7 (1989) ("[N]either the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
nor the equal protection guarantee of 'meaningful access' required the State to appoint
counsel for indigent prisoners seeking state postconviction relief.").
481 U.S. 551 (1987).

42
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(b) (1) (B) (ii) states: "An application for a writ of habeas corpus on
behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State
court shall not be granted unless it appears that... circumstances exist that render such process ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 4 3 Whether these rights include constitutional rights of the
prisoners in their postconviction proceedings is up for debate. The
Court itself has been silent on this matter. As it stands, our inquiry
into this matter is guided only by a twenty-five-year-old circuit split.
III. FINDING THE RIGHT AVENUE FOR RELIEF: THE CIRCUIT SPLIT

Whether a constitutional error in state postconviction proceedings can be cognizable as the basis for a writ of habeas corpus begs
the question: If the traditional scope of habeas corpus is invoked by
the government illegally retaining custody of a person, then how does
a postconviction state proceeding fit into this scheme? State collateral proceedings are "civil action(s] designed to overturn a presumptively valid criminal judgment. 4 4 Yet at the same time, " [i] t cannot be
denied that collateral relief proceedings are a central part of the review process for prisoners sentenced to death. 4" Further, "[s] tate
postconviction proceedings also are the cornerstone for all subsequent attempts to obtain collateral relief ... [as the state court's determinations] may control the scope of a federal court's review of a
,,46
subsequent petition for a writ of habeas corpus ....
Hypothetically, a grave constitutional error occurs in a postconviction proceeding when the judge is clearly and obviously biased
against the defendant. According to a majority of the circuit courts
of appeals, the defendant has no recourse to challenge these proceedings.47 One circuit alone recognized the irrationality of such decisions.
A. In the Minority: The First Circuit and Dickerson v. Walsh
In Dickerson v. Walsh, the First Circuit held a petitioner's claim of
constitutionally deficient postconviction proceedings cognizable as

43

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1) (B) (ii).

44
45
46
47

Murray, 492 U.S. at 13 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
Id. at 14 (KennedyJ., concurring).
Id. at 26 (Stevens,J, dissenting).
See supra note 3 for a list of circuits denying relief and cognizability for errors in a postconviction proceeding.
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the basis for a habeas petition.48 The petitioner alleged that the Massachusetts postconviction review procedure violated his equal protection rights under the Fourteenth Amendment because it treated him,
as a capital defendant, differently than a non-capital defendant. Petitioner had to seek leave for access to the postconviction procedure
from a Massachusetts Court of Appeals, whereas non-capital defendants received access by right. 49 The First Circuit noted that "a number of courts have refused to consider attacks on postconviction proceedings by habeas petitions on the grounds that errors or defects in
a state post-conviction proceeding do not ipsofacto render a detention
unlawful and, therefore, the petitioner is not entitled to habeas corpus relief. '0 However, the First Circuit opinion continued: "[T]his
position is appealing at first blush, [but] on analysis we find that it is
neither consonant with basic policies of habeas corpus relief nor Supreme Court rulings.', 51 The opinion spoke of the need for a remedy,
recognizing that the Commonwealth of Massachusetts acknowledged
this need as well in its oral argument, but advocated instead for a suit
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 5
Relying on Preiserv. Rodriguez,53 the First Circuit based its decision
for cognizability on habeas as opposed to a § 1983 suit for two reasons. First, the Supreme Court held in Preiserthat, "when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled
to immediate release or a speedier release from that imprisonment,
his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus. '' 5 4 Thus, the category of claims cognizable on habeas corpus is determined by the underlying reason for the claim and the remedy hoped to correct the
infirmity.

48
49
50
51
52

53
54

750 F.2d 150 (1st Cir. 1984).
Id. at 151.
Id. at 152-53.
Id. at 153.
Id. at 153, 153 n.6. The statute, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, in its present form provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to
be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law,
suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress ....For the purposes of this
section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall
be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
411 U.S. 475 (1973).
Id. at 500.
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The subject matter jurisdiction of the federal court is determined
by these underlying purposes of the petition. Because Dickerson
challenged the very fact of his physical imprisonment, regardless of
where he was in the appeal process, his claim fell within the traditional subject matter of the writ of habeas corpus and therefore was
entitled to its protection.
Second, the First Circuit acknowledged that Massachusetts "has a
profound interest in its own criminal procedure and, if it is defective,
ought to be given the first opportunity to correct it."55 According to
Preiser,federal habeas corpus "serves the important function of allowing the State to deal with these ...problems on its own, while pre-

serving for the state prisoner an expeditious federal forum for the
vindication of his federally protected rights, if the State has denied
redress.' 56 Given these strong considerations of comity, the judgment
over a state's own internal criminal process requires an instrument
which takes into account these issues.
There is no exhaustion requirement for § 1983. 5' The state court
system may be bypassed immediately and the claim brought only before a federal court. Thus, out of respect for a state's desire to be
self-corrective, the First Circuit determined that habeas corpus was
the appropriate vehicle for Dickerson's claim. 5'
B. CategoricalDenial: The Majority of the Circuits and TheirErroneous
Reasoning
The majority of the circuits, in contrast, categorically denied these
claims as cognizable. These courts followed the reasoning expressed
in Williams v. Missouri,9 which specified that "the state's postconviction remedy procedure cannot serve as a basis for setting aside

55

56
57

58
59

Dickerson, 750 F.2d at 153-54.
Preiser,411 U.S. at 498.
For an exhaustive, but at times, erroneous discussion of the distinctions between habeas
corpus and § 1983, see Martin A. Schwartz, The Preiser Puzzle: Continued FrustratingConflict Between the Civil Rights and Habeas Corpus Remedies for State Prisoners, 37 DEPAUL L. REV.
85 (1988).
However, this claim was dismissed because the "the petitioner's state remedies" had not
been exhausted. Dickerson, 750 F.2d at 154.
640 F.2d 140 (8th Cir. 1981). See supra note 3 for a full list of the circuits which represent the majority view on this issue. I have chosen Williams v. Missouri to represent this
view as it is the most quoted of the opinions, owing to its quotable phrase "Errors or defects in the state post-conviction proceeding do not, ipsofacto, render a prisoner's detention unlawful or raise constitutional questions cognizable in habeas corpus proceedings."
Id. at 143-44.
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a valid original conviction. '' 60 The Eighth Circuit, in denying cognizability, stated that "[a]dequacy or unavailability of state postconviction procedures is material here only in the context of exhaustion of state remedies of federally protected rights and not to review
alleged trial errors."'" In Williams, an alleged Sixth Amendment violation was dismissed for the same reasons given in Murray (that the
Sixth Amendment only applies in the criminal context). 62 The
Eighth Circuit erroneously reasoned that the purpose of the postconviction proceeding a priori invalidated the use of habeas because it
did not challenge the underlying criminal trial which led to the confinement. This analysis overlooked the practical purpose of postconviction process: to raise constitutional infirmities arising in the underlying criminal trial, not merely to exhaust state remedies to these
violations. Ignoring the practical purpose of a postconviction proceeding, the Eighth Circuit disregarded the defendant's constitutional rights, which existed beyond the underlying criminal trial.
Other courts adopted the Williams analysis for other constitutional
claims with the same blanket denial and the same disregard for con63
These decistitutionally deficient state postconviction procedures.
sions provide little further insight into the majority's analytical reasoning. Theyjust denied the claims.
The Supreme Court never ruled on this issue. It is considered by
some to be irrelevant4 and yet, it is a gaping hole in a complicated
minefield of jurisprudence and statutory language surrounding habeas corpus review. It is generally considered settled law that the
Sixth Amendment does not extend to postconviction proceedings.6'
But what about other protections afforded by the Bill of Rights?

60
61
62
63

64

65

Id. at 143.
Id.
See id. at 144; Murray v. Giarratano,492 U.S. 1, 19 (1989).
See, e.g., Hale v. Lockhart, 903 F.2d 545, 548 (8th Cir. 1990) (denying cognizability to a
claim of due process violation even though the court reporter took excessive amounts of
time to provide a trial transcript to the defense); Williams-Bey v. Trickey, 894 F.2d 314,
317 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 936 (1990) (claiming courts were only statutorily
authorized to review the constitutionality of a criminal conviction, not the resulting state
postconviction proceeding).
See, e.g., Arthur D. Hellman, By Precedent Unbound: The Nature and Extent of Unresolved Intercircuit Conflicts, 56 U. PITr.L. REv. 693, 770 n.294 (1995) (expressing the irrelevancy of
the circuit split because Dickerson v. Walsh dismissed the claim on procedural grounds).
Eric M. Freedman makes a bold argument against this categorization of the law, claiming
the fifth vote, held by Justice Kennedy is in fact still a swing vote, depending on the facts
of the case before the Court. See Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right
To Counsel in State CapitalPostconvictionProceedings,91 CORNELL L. REV. 1079 (2006).
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There is clear precedent 6 which leads to the conclusion that these
constitutional violations should, nay, must be cognizable as the basis
for a writ of habeas corpus.

IV. WHAT EXACTLY IS STATE HABEAS? THE NATURE OF THE
POSTCONVICTION PROCEEDING: CIVIL OR CRIMINAL

Part of the dilemma over what, if any, constitutional protections
are available in the state postconviction proceedings is a question of
the nature of the review: Is it criminal or civil? There are even questions as to the "scope of the State's obligation" to provide a full collateral review process.67 The process itself varies from state to state.
According to the Supreme Court, " [i] t is not part of the criminal68
proceeding itself, and it is in fact considered to be civil in nature.,
Yet, if the purpose of such a proceeding is the affirmation of a criminal sentence, or a reevaluation of the constitutional grounds for a
man's punishment for a crime, these proceedings "though they may
be civil in form, are in their nature criminal."6' 9
For a capital defendant, it is impossible to understate the importance of a state's collateral review process. AEDPA demands that federal courts give almost full discretion to state courts' decisions in
postconviction proceedings both in terms of procedurally barring
certain claims and in determining questions of both fact and law.7 °
The state statutes, which control and determine the structure of the
collateral review procedures, are therefore critical to a determination
of what rights a capital defendant retains in a postconviction proceeding, specifically those which are more "quasi criminal" than others.7"

66
67

68
69
70

71

See infra Part V for a discussion of the precedent leading to this conclusion.
See Kyles v. Whitley, 498 U.S. 931, 932 (1990) (Stevens, J., concurring) (documenting the
rarity of the Supreme Court involving itself at the state postconviction stage in litigation
because of uncertainty regarding the state's responsibilities).
Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 557 (1987).
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886) (determining that the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments applied to civil as well as criminal searches).
See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (identifying
the structural magnitude of the state postconviction proceeding as a result of the standards of review in AEDPA).
While this is not a dispositive point, it is interesting that state postconviction proceedings
automatically go back to the original sentencing judge from the trial, instead of being
randomly assigned, like other civil review proceedings. This practice supports my suggestion that in fact these postconviction proceedings are quasi criminal, because they are de
facto continuations of the trial and direct appeal. See, e.g., Russel J. Davis, Postconviction
Proceedings, in 28A STANDARD PENNSYLVANIA PRACTICE 2D § 138:1 (2008) (commenting
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This is not an attempt to argue that ftderal habeas corpus is criminal in nature. Many of the state postconviction proceedings, however, are defined by their respective state legislatures as criminal. 73
Some states have even enacted unitary appeals processes, 74 even as
two other state courts have struck down similar statutes as illegal under their respective constitutions.
There are certain downfalls for
the defendant to classify these unified proceedings as criminal,7 but
there are also immeasurable benefits such as drastically increased
constitutional protections for the defendant.
The Supreme Court, silent on the exact nature of the postconviction procedure, said in Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock,77 "for the purposes
of applying the Due Process Clause .... [to] a State's proceedings[,] .. state law provides strong guidance .... ,78 The Court further affirmed this sentiment in Allen v. Illinois,79 in which it directed

the inquiry as to "whether a particular proceeding is criminal" to be
"first of all a question of statutory construction. '' so
Applying these directions to the postconviction proceeding, many
of these statutes would be deemed criminal. For example, the Tennessee Post Conviction Procedure Act at no point mentions explicitly

72
73

74

that there is a preference for requiring the same judge to officiate both the trial and the
postconviction proceeding for reasons of expediency and familiarity with the case).
See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 423-24 (1963) (characterizing the traditional use of the writ
of habeas corpus as a civil remedy).
See, e.g., Tennessee Post Conviction Procedure Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 40-30-101 to
-30-122 (2004).
A unitary appeals system is when both the direct appeal and the postconviction proceeding appeal (state habeas) occur at the same time, consolidating these two separate appeals. There are three states which seem to operate uniform appeals processes. Idaho
(IDAHO CODE ANN. § 19-2719 (2004)); Oklahoma (Post-Conviction Procedure Act, OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1089 (2003)); Texas (TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 11.071

75

76

77
78
79

80

(Vernon 2005)). All of these statutes vary in terms of procedural and substantive requirements.
Florida and Pennsylvania have both created unitary appeal statutes only to have them
struck down by their respective state supreme courts. See Allen v. Butterworth, 756 So. 2d
52, 54 (Fla. 2000); In re Suspension of Capital Unitary Review Act, 772 A.2d 676, 689 (Pa.
1999).
For example, under most state rules of civil procedure, there are broader rules governing
discovery which can be particularly advantageous for prisoners. For more information,
see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28 at § 7.1 (identifying postconviction proceeding
counsel's responsibilities in light of the civil nature of the collateral appeal).
485 U.S. 624 (1988) (finding a law adjudging a father's ability to meet his alimony payments to be determined by state law as to its civil nature).
Id. at 631; see id. (discussing the distinction between civil and criminal contempt trials).
478 U.S. 364 (1986) (determining a statute defining people as sexually dangerous to be
civil, not criminal, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against selfincrimination).
Id. at 368.

JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LA W

[Vol. 10:5

that it is civil in nature.8' The Tennessee Supreme Court in State v.
ScaleS 2 explicitly held for the purposes of the timeliness of the notice
of appeal, "post-conviction proceedings are criminal in nature.8 3 In
later decisions, however, the Tennessee Supreme Court determined
that only certain elements of the proceeding were criminal in nature,
while others were civil, convoluting an already complicated procedure .4
In the interest of comity, the federal government generally defers
to the statutory interpretation by a state court of its own criminal
statute.8' By extension, the same constitutional protections available
in criminal proceedings would extend to petitioners in the postconviction proceedings, because they are also classified as criminal procedures. Even if a state did not explicitly say the procedures were
criminal, but followed Tennessee's example (identifying parts of the
procedure as criminal and others as civil), it would be impossible to
divide the proceeding into civil and criminal sections. Logically, the
constitutional protections would have to extend over the entire pro-

ceeding (just as they should with a unitary appeals system). Any
other decision would seem to implicate a Due Process Clause violation because of basic unfairness to the defendant.
The Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause stands for fun86
damental fairness, which is clearly missing in the situation described
above. Because there is no constitutionally required counsel for an
indigent petitioner in a postconviction proceeding," a prisoner
would have to determine what sections of his proceeding would grant
him more constitutional protection than others.88 Obviously, this le-

81
82
83
84
85

86

87
88

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 399 (1963).
767 S.W.2d 157 (Tenn. 1989) (finding time limits of notices of appeals comporting with
criminally-based rules of appellate procedure).
Id. at 158.
See State v. Nix, 40 S.W.3d 459, 463 (Tenn. 2001) (determining postconviction proceedings are civil with regards to statutes of limitations).
See, e.g., Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20, 33 (1882) ("Since the ordinary administration
of the law is carried on by the State courts, it necessarily happens that by the course of
their decisions certain rules are established ....Such established rules are always regarded by the Federal courts, no less than by the State courts themselves, as authoritative
declarations of what the law is.").
See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 556-57 (1987) (requiring a state's postconviction
proceeding to comport with "fundamental fairness mandated by the Due Process
Clause").
See Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 1 (1989).
Even acknowledging Justice O'Connor's reminder that "once society has validly convicted
an individual of a crime and therefore established its right to punish, the demands of due
process are reduced accordingly," Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 429 (1986), due
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gal labyrinth would call into question the fundamental fairness of
such a confusing procedure. Postconviction proceedings are therefore, in many cases, going to be constitutionally deficient.
Is there a solution to this dilemma? Perhaps the federal government should require that all postconviction proceedings be statutorily defined as civil. Such a requirement would raise the issues of
comity, but it is not fundamentally fair to deny a capital defendant,
literally fighting for his right to live, an avenue to address these constitutional concerns simply because in keeping with the traditional
nature of the Great Writ, these proceedings are summarily called
civil.89 As Justice Marshall famously stated in Ford v. Wainwright, a
landmark case championing prisoner's rights, "Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same presumptions accorded a
defendant who has yet to be convicted or sentenced, he has not lost
the protection of the Constitution altogether." °

89

90

process of law is substantially different in criminal proceedings, even after valid conviction.
In the alternative, even if a state postconviction statute proclaims it is civil in nature, the
Supreme Court held this as not always dispositive, creating a test to determine if the statute is punitive or regulatory in nature (criminal or civil). They adopted a seven-factor test
from Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963), which includes:
Whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint, whether it has
historically been regarded as a punishment[,] whether it comes into play only on a
finding of scienter, whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence, whether the behavior to which it applies is
already a crime, whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it, and whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned are all relevant to the inquiry, and may often point in
differing directions. Absent conclusive evidence of congressional intent as to the
penal nature of a statute, these factors must be considered in relation to the statute on its face.
Id. at 168-69 (citations omitted).
While this would not be an easy burden to overcome, the Supreme Court has held a
state court's determination of the nature of a proceeding (or definition of a crime) can
be in itself a violation of the United States Constitution when applied without a basis in
evidence. For example, in the Lunch Counter Cases, the Supreme Court disposed of the
southern states' justifications for the conviction of African American protestors as violating disturbing the peace laws. See, e.g., Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157 (1961); Thompson v. Louisville, 362 U.S. 199 (1960) (dismissing a state conviction as being devoid of
evidence of guilt of the crime charged and therefore violating due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 411.
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V. WHAT IS A RIGHT WITHOUT A REMEDY? HECK V. HUMPHREY, FORD V.
WAINWRIGHT, AND THE CHOICE OF HABEAS CORPUS

Even if the quagmire presented by state postconviction proceedings is not clarified, two cases in the past twenty-five years, when
looked at together, indicate a clear (if inadvertent) logical step by the
Supreme Court towards recognizing constitutional errors in postconviction proceedings as within the subject matter jurisdiction of a federal court on a habeas petition. 9'
In Heck v. Humphrey,92 the Court expanded the ruling in Preiserv.
Rodrigue93 to exclude any other legal avenues (other causes of action
besides the writ of habeas) for any prisoner's claim which "call [s] into
question the lawfulness of conviction or confinement. 9 4 Eight years
previous, in Ford v. Wainwright,95 the Court held a state's determination of a capital defendant's postconviction sanity unconstitutional
because it lacked many of the fundamental due process protections
constitutionally required in such a proceeding. 96
Together, these two cases require the cognizability of constitutional errors in state collateral review on federal habeas petitions because: 1) Ford v. Wainwright explicitly acknowledges procedural due
process rights inherent in state postconviction proceedings; and 2)
Heck v. Humphrey forecloses any other avenue except federal habeas
proceedings to adjudicate the violation of these rights. The holdings
of these cases form the basis for the claim that any right or privilege
granted by the states to petitioners in postconviction proceedings
(including court-appointed counsel) is protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and therefore can form the
basis for a federal habeas petition.
The Court in Ford v. Wainwright invalidated a Florida statute 9v that
dictated the procedure for determining the sanity of a capital defendant, on the grounds that it did not satisfy the Due Process Clause
because it did not provide the petitioner "a full and fair hearing" on
91

92
93
94
95
96
97

This Part is largely in response to a thesis proposed in a footnote of Randy Hertz and
James S. Liebman's comprehensive and illuminating treatise on Habeas Corpus. See
HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28. While I will not continually cite to this footnote (unless
I am directly quoting), it was one of the main inspirations for this Comment.
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
411 U.S. 475 (1973). Yet, it did not speak kindly of the actual ruling in Preiser, calling its
dicta "an unreliable, if not an unintelligible, guide." Heck, 512 U.S. at 482.
Heck, 512 U.S. at 483.
Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 416.
FLA. STAT. § 922.07 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
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the critical issue of his sanity.9 At the heart of this opinion is the acknowledgement that regardless of the nature of the proceeding, or
the guilt/conviction status of the prisoner, "[t] he fundamental requisite of due process of law is the opportunity to be heard.' 99 Since the
Florida statute did not allow for the petitioner to present any evidence or be heard in his claim of mental insanity, it violated this cornerstone of American law. The state process for evaluating the claim
was rendered ineffective to protect the petitioner's rights. 00
Justice Powell attempted to limit the holding in his concurrence
by pointing out the special nature of the issue of sanity' and distinguishing the level of deference owed to a governor (the primary decision maker in Florida's statute) as opposed to that owed to a state
court. O2 He refused to "determine the precise limits that due process
imposes in this area."'' 0 3 However, the thrust of the holding survived,
summarized by Justice O'Connor in her concurring opinion:
Our cases leave no doubt that where a statute indicates with "language of
an unmistakabl[y] mandatory character," that state conduct injurious to

an individual will not occur "absent specified substantive predicates,"4 the
statute creates an expectation protected by the Due Process Clause.
The case Justice O'Connor relied upon for this conclusion was overruled on its application to administrative regulations in prisons, 0 5 but
the jurisprudence still supports O'Connor's clear expression of the
protections owed to prisoners sentenced to death. As the Supreme
Court held in Evitts v. Lucey, "when a State opts to act in a field where
its action has significant discretionary elements, it must nonetheless
act in accord with the dictates of the Constitution-and, in particular,
in accord with the Due Process Clause.' 0 0 The Constitution, thus, de98

99
100
101
102
103
104
105

106

Ford, 477 U.S. at 418. Interestingly, this phrase used to be included in the previous federal habeas corpus statute, but was excised in the current AEDPA legislation for reasons
unknown.
Id. at 413 (quoting Grannis v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394 (1914)).
See Ford, 477 U.S. at 399.
Id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring) (explaining that judging sanity is subjective and requires expert analysis).
Id. at 423.
Id. at 427.
Id. at 428 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (quoting Hewitt v. Helms, 459 U.S. 460, 471-72
(1983), overruled by Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472 (1995)).
See Sandin, 515 U.S. at 484 (realigning the due process test for state-granted rights to focus on the liberty protected as opposed to the liberty expectation created by the state).
There are still questions as to whether Sandin's ruling actually overrules Ford, because
Sandin focused exclusively on prison administrative regulations and did not speak to
postconviction proceedings or capital punishment.
469 U.S. 387, 401 (1985) (requiring due process as to first appeal of right); see Letty S. Di
Giulio, Note, Dyingfor the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in State Post-ConvictionPro-
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fines the "kind of process a State10 7must afford prior to depriving an
individual of a protected liberty.,

In contrast to Powell's attempt to pigeonhole this case to its facts,
Ford v. Wainwright emphasized the general constitutional principle
protecting expectations of due process of law when the state defines a
right along with its procedural implementation."' 0
With this standard in place, the next question is: Where would a
convicted prisoner, still imprisoned, seek to validate and remedy
these constitutional infringements? Under Heck v. Humphrey (and by
extension Preiserv. Rodriguez) the only avenue available for such a suit
is § 2254.0 9
Before Heck, there were considerable legitimate arguments to pursue a suit for constitutional violations in a postconviction proceeding
under § 1983.110 These arguments were couched in terms similar to
those of Williams. Reasoning because the constitutional violation
does not directly dispute the fact or duration of the confinement, the
argument goes, it is more analogous to a claim against a prison administrative determination, which is in the province of § 1983. An
argument like this might have held traction before Heck, but the Supreme Court's decision foreclosed this line of argument.
To be clear, when a constitutional violation occurs in a postconviction proceeding for a capital defendant, the remedy sought is not
damages. The remedy sought is a new postconviction proceeding or
a federal habeas corpus review de novo of the violation. Therefore,
§ 1983 is not the appropriate avenue for relief because it is solely confined to redressing problems with damages or an injunction. 1 '
Furthermore, the Court re-emphasized that "habeas corpus is the
exclusive remedy for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks immediate or speedier release,

107
108

109
110
111

ceedings: State Statutes & Due Process in Capital Cases, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 109, 129-31
(1999) (identifying and arguing for the proposition that once states extend a statutory
right of legal representation, they have a corresponding Due Process Clause requirement
to ensure that such representation is, at a minimum, effective).
Ford, 477 U.S. at 428-29 (O'Connor,J., concurring).
This would include any postconviction proceeding, any right to counsel granted by the
state, or further rights specified in postconviction acts or statutes. For a further list of
possible "inadequate state corrective process" arguments, see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra
note 28, § 7.1b, at 346.
For an excellent, extended discussion of Heck v. Humphrey and its subsequent effect on
cases, see HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28, § 9.1, at 439 n.6.
See Schwartz, supra note 57, at 159-61.
See Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 481 (1994) (specifying that the remedy provided by
§ 1983 is monetary damages).
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even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of
§ 1983."'112 Finally, the court prohibited § 1983 claims where "to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment.., whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid," stating that such a claim "is not cognizable under
§ 1983.""

3

Recalling the arguments used in Williams, Heck could be disputed
on the ground that a constitutional error in a postconviction proceeding does not challenge the fact or duration of the confinement.
But it is illogical to say that the distinction between life in prison and
a death sentence does not fit under the definition of duration of confinement: "Challenges to the validity of any confinement or to'' particulars affecting its duration are the province of habeas corpus. 14
Two hypotheticals can illustrate how a constitutional error in a
postconviction proceeding could in fact challenge the validity of a
confinement and conviction. Suppose there is a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel under the Sixth Amendment which cannot, in
certain states, be brought until after the direct appeal.1 5 In hypothetical A, the state system is a unified appeal system. There is no
chance for the prisoner to have different counsel for his postconviction proceeding because it is combined with his direct appeal. Instead, he has the same lawyer who was ineffective the first time and
does not raise the Sixth Amendment claim in the postconviction proceeding. This system of appeal would therefore violate the prisoner's
constitutional right to fully present his Sixth Amendment claim for a
full and fair hearing. If he is able, under Ford and Heck, to finally
raise this claim in his federal habeas petition because the constitutional violation occurred also in the postconviction proceeding, he
could in fact prove the invalidity of his underlying conviction due to
the ineffective assistance of counsel.
In hypothetical B, the state system is a traditional system that begins the postconviction proceeding shortly after the direct appeal has
concluded. But State B automatically appoints counsel for the post-

112

Id.at 481.

113

Id. at 486-87.

114

See HERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28, § 9.1, at 439 n.6 (noting the continued recognition
in Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004), of habeas corpus as an avenue of relief

115

for prisoners).
Some states require that these claims only be brought after direct appeal is finished, and,
in Massaro v. United States, the Supreme Court held that federal prisoners do not have to
raise claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal, but can wait until
collateral review. 538 U.S. 500, 508-09 (2003).
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conviction proceedings. Under Ford, a minimal due process standard
of meaningful assistance should attach to this right. 116 Assume this
counsel is completely ineffectual and does not investigate appropriate
claims, claims which could cause the underlying conviction to be reversed and save the life of the prisoner. Thus, the due process violations of the right granted voluntarily by State B amount to a constitutional violation in the postconviction proceeding that could clearly
challenge the fact or duration of confinement. Arguments to the
contrary are "appealing at first blush,"" 7 but do nothing to address or
remedy critical constitutional violations.
VI.

POSSIBLE SOLUTIONS

The Heck and Ford decisions shape the possible solutions for the
quandary their holdings present. Capital prisoners have rights, identified as requiring protection under the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment when granted by the states (if not granted
automatically by the quasi criminal nature of the postconviction proceeding). There is only one remedy available to a suit which could
invalidate the underlying conviction: habeas corpus. However, there
are severe policy considerations involved in allowing these errors to
proceed straight to federal court.
The biggest concerns of enlarging the scope of habeas corpus are
comity and the possible resulting tension between federal and state
courts."' One of the pushing forces behind the changing face of habeas, issues of comity have been present since its mention in the Constitution to its most recent makeover under AEDPA." 9 If the subject
matter jurisdiction of habeas corpus is, as argued here, enlarged by
Heck and Ford, solutions must be proposed which would minimize the
effect of this enlargement on concerns of comity as well as satisfy one
of the statutory requirements of federal
habeas corpus protection:
20
1
remedies.
court
state
of
exhaustion

116

117
118

See Celestine Richards McConville, The Right to Effective Assistance of CapitalPostconviction
Counsel: ConstitutionalImplications of Statutory Grants of Capital Counsel, 2003 WiS. L. REV.
31, 67-68, for a very useful and complete investigation of the due process protections
which should attach when a state grants a right to counsel.
Dickerson v. Walsh, 750 F.2d 150, 153 (1st Cir. 1984).
See Chemerinsky, supra note 16, at 762 (listing four major concerns, instead of just one,
when discussing the scope of habeas corpus).

119

See id.

120

28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (2000).
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Luckily, the issue of comity dovetails with that of the exhaustion
requirement. As discussed before, Congress originally granted state
prisoners the right to habeas corpus proceedings due to distrust of
state courts. 12 This paranoia is no longer legally justifiable. Comity
assumes that "state judiciaries are equal to federal courts in their ability and willingness to protect federal rights., 12 2 The exhaustion requirement is another nod to this mutual respect; it "allows state
courts to interpret and enforce state criminal laws.... [delaying federal court review] until the state123 has had a full chance to correct any
errors in its law or procedures.'
As previously discussed, these claims, if determined to be cognizable on a petition for federal habeas corpus, would fall into the section
of AEDPA when circumstances exist that render such state processes
ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant. 2 4 This would, in
practice, circumvent the exhaustion requirements and oblige federal
district courts to hold new, full and fair hearings on the claims
brought before them or remand the claims back to the state courts to
conduct the hearings. This latter choice would be preferable for
both parties: for the federal courts because it lightens their case load,
and for the state courts because it allows them the chance to address
and adjudicate procedural issues in their own system of criminal law
(exactly the purpose of the exhaustion requirement).
As argued by Judge J. Skelly Wright and Abraham D. Sofaer in
their seminal article, FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The Allocation of Fact-FindingResponsibility,25 if a federal court deems these
state procedures lacking in due process protection enough to require
the state courts to hold hearings to adjudicate the constitutional
claims on their merits, then it can be assumed that they are, inter alia,
constitutionally invalid procedures. 126 States would therefore be constitutionally required to fix these procedures. A solution to the problem of comity and the desire to fulfill the exhaustion requirement
would require either: (a) a change in the statutory requirements of
state postconviction proceedings to require certain minimal due
process protections to be followed as a matter of federal law, leaving

121

See, e.g., Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 326 (1915) (explaining that the writ of habeas

122

corpus was available whenever a state court violated a prisoner's due process rights).
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 2, at 840.

123

Id. at 861.

124

See supra note 43 and accompanying text.

125

SeeWright & Sofaer, supranote 33.

126

Id. at 906-19; accordHERTZ & LIEBMAN, supra note 28, § 7.1b n.48 (citing Wright & Sofaer,
supra note 33, at 906-19).
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"to the State the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the
constitutional restriction [s]y27; or (b) the creation of a two-pronged
test for federal district courts to apply to such claims. Similar to the
high burden of proof for hearings on new evidence in federal habeas
proceedings (in which the petitioner not only has to show he could
not have raised the claim earlier, but must also show that "but for"
the lack of this factual predicate due to a constitutional error, "no
reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the
underlying offense"

28

), this test could create a workable solution on

how to proceed with such claims within the already existing framework of AEDPA.
This second solution, while pacifying concerns of comity, would
greatly limit the number of meritorious habeas claims. It is a stiff
burden to meet. However, this avenue should only be available for
constitutional errors which truly offended the fundamental fairness
of the postconviction proceeding process. In this manner, concerns
over using habeas corpus to adjudicate claims not directly impacting
the underlying conviction could be quieted. This relief would only
be available for claims like those illustrated in the hypotheticals' 9 -in
which the constitutional error in the collateral review impacted the
petitioner's ability to properly address constitutional errors arising in
the original trial or direct appeal.
VII. CONCLUSION

Congress can extend the jurisdiction of habeas corpus beyond its
constitutionally mandated minimum, but it cannot restrict its purpose: to vindicate the rights of prisoners held in violation of the
Constitution.
There is a need for a safety valve for capital defendants faced with
fundamentally unfair postconviction proceedings. As dictated by Supreme Court precedent and suggested by the states' own postconviction relief acts, habeas corpus is the legally correct forum for addressing these claims. Constitutional errors in postconviction proceedings
for capital defendants should be cognizable as the basis for a writ of
federal habeas corpus.
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Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 416 (1986).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(e) (2) (A) (ii), 2254(e) (2) (B) (2000).
See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.

